Recent history suggests that many boom-bust cycles are naturally driven by linkages between the credit market and asset prices. Additionally, new structured securities have been developed, e.g., MBS, CDOs, and CDS, which have acted as instruments of risk transfer. We show that there is a certain non-robustness in the pricing of these instruments and we create a model in which their role in the recent nancial market meltdown, and in which the mechanism by which they exacerbate leverage cycles, is explicit. We rst discuss the extent to which complex securities can amplify boom-bust cycles. Then, we propose a model in which distinct nancial market boom-bust cycles emerge naturally. We demonstrate the interaction of leveraging and asset pricing in a dynamical model and spell out some implications for monetary policy.
Introduction
Ecient capital markets are supposed to evaluate and price risk; but frequently, if risk assessment is measured and priced through nancial market instruments, we observe signicant non-robustness in risk evaluation and asset prices.
1 Moreover, markets exhibit externalities, resulting in failures, dis-inter-mediation, and meltdowns. The busts, precipitated by nancial instability, usually entail contagion eects and strong negative impacts for the real side of the economy. There is some synchronized behavior of economic agents and some mechanisms, observable in boom-bust cycles, that are rather general: the boom period triggers overcondence, overvaluation of assets, over-leveraging, and the underestimation of risk; then follows a triggering event and the market mood turns pessimistic; nally, undervaluation of asset prices and deleveraging. Most of the historically experienced boom-bust cycles exhibited such features. 2 We consider three historical illustrations.
First is the emerging-markets crisis of the 1990s. Several emerging markets experienced such cycles in the 1990s; for example Mexico (1994) , Asia (1997/8) , Russia (1998) , and Argentina (2001). Those countries, after capital market liberalization, passed through a considerable boom period characterized by overvaluation of asset prices, the lowering of risk perceptions, foreign borrowing, and capital inows. Yet, suddenly, the distrust of the countries' fundamentals led to a sudden reversal of these same capital ows; this triggered rapid exchange-rate depreciation, nancial instability, and consequently, a sharp decline in economic activity.
Second is the information technology boom-bust cycle of the 1990s. In the US and Europe, during the period from 2001 through 2002, the nancial markets experienced a signicant decline in asset prices, commonly referred to as the bursting of the Information Technology (IT) stock market bubble (the dot-com bust). Overvaluation of asset prices and the lowering of risk perceptions, in combination with a decade of dubious accounting practices (see MacAvoy and Millstein, 2004 ) and short-sighted investment, led to a situation where, suddenly, equity valuations sharply declined.
Third is the recent nancial meltdown, which began in the US sub-prime (mortgage) market in 2007, evolved as credit crisis through the US-banking system in 2008/9, and sub-1 Some historically important approaches to risk assessment, credit-default, etc. are gather together in Semmler and Bernard (2007) . 2 The economic literature that stress this line of thinking arises mostly in the Keynesian tradition, e.g., Minsky (1975 Minsky ( , 1982 Minsky ( , 1986 , Tobin (1980) , Kindleberger (2005) and Gallegati et al. (2011) . These thinkers have been very inuential in studying nancially driven boom-bust cycles. There is also another important insight into this interaction as represented by Robert Shiller's (1991 Shiller's ( , 2001 ) overreaction hypothesis. For the most part, the above research is inuenced by Keynes' view on the role of "animal spirit" in booms and busts. Another non-neoclassical tradition, also stressing those negative externalities, originates in work by Stiglitz and his co-authors. They draw upon recent developments in information economics, wherein systematic attempts have been made to describe how actual nancial markets operate by referring to the concepts of asymmetric information, adverse selection, and moral hazard.
sequently spread world-wide, causing a world-wide nancial panic, and staggering declines in global growth rates. This time, the usual boom-bust mechanism was reinforced by new nancial innovations; specically, the development of new nancial intermediations through complex securities, e.g., mortgage backed securities (MBS), collateralized default obligations (CDO), and credit default swaps (CDS). The complex securities, which were supposed to outsource and diversify idiosyncratic risk, have, jointly with the changes in the macroeconomic environment, actually accelerated not only the boom, but also the bust, rstly through high asset prices and high leveraging and then, secondly, an asset-price collapse and credit crunch.
Those innovations provided the magnication of a nancial mechanism through which the asset price boom and bust became more distinct.
The Asian nancial market crisis and the technology bubble of the 1990s seem to be well understood.
3 Yet, the current nancial crisis is less well analyzed. It seems to be neither a nancial crisis triggered by a currency run nor a technology bubble, but rather a home-made nancial crisis resulting from two driving forces: macroeconomic changes (nancial market liberalization, 4 low interest rates, high liquidity, easy credit, and external imbalance), and the use of new nancial innovations and new tools of risk management which substantially helped to increase leveraging. Conclusive studies of the recent nancial market events are still missing. Yet, there is some preliminary analysis. Popular wisdom attributes the last boom and the run-up in housing sector to Greenspan's low interest rate policy. There is evidence to suggest that interest rates had already come down signicantly since the middle of the 1980s, along with the decline in ination; the housing boom started much later.
There is also some truth to the view that Greenspan has expressed: that the Fed can reduce short term interest rates, but has no power over long-term rates and, consequently, the yield curve, which also impacts mortgage rates. In fact, the yield curve, in recent years, had become rather at or even downward sloping as the US had become a magnet for capital 3 During the 1990s, work was done on understanding the Asian crisis. Mishkin (1998) , for example, has posited an explanation of the Asian nancial crisis of 1997/8 using an information-theoretic approach. A similar theory, by Krugman (1999) , laid the blame on banks' and rms' deteriorating balance sheets. Miller and Stiglitz (1999) employ a multiple-equilibria model to explain nancial crises in general. These theories point to the perils of too-fast liberalization of nancial markets and to the consequent need for government bank supervision and guarantees. However, Burnside et al. (2001) view government guarantees as actual causes of nancial crises. These authors argue that the lack of private hedging of exchange rate risk by rms and banks led to nancial crises in Asia. Other authors, following the bank run model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that nancial crises occur if there is a lack of short-term liquidity. Further modeling of nancial crises triggered by exchange-rate shocks can be found in Edwards (1999) . The latter discusses the role of the IMF as the lender of last resort. Recent work on the role of currency in nancial crises can be found in Kato, Proano and Semmler (2009) and Roethig, Semmler and Flaschel (2007) . The latter authors pursue a macroeconomic approach to model currency and nancial crises and consider the role of currency hedging in mitigating nancial crises. See also the papers by Bernanke and Mishkin, see Bernanke et al. (1983; 1994; 1998) and Mishkin (1998) ; on the IT bubble, see Semmler (2006, ch. 7) .
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Proponents of capital market liberalization cite possible benets generated by free capital mobility such as: 1) reducing trading costs, low costs of nancial transaction in particular, 2) increase of investment returns, 3) lowering the cost of capital when rms invest, 4) increasing liquidity in the nancial market, and 5) increasing economic growth and positive employment eects. We do not want to deny those possible benets, yet the proper sequencing of market liberalizations, sucient safety precautions, and properly prudential regulations are important. and attracted savings from the rest of the world; this kept the interest rate on the long end rather low.
Another view takes the housing sector as central. It is argued that the purchase of housing by baby-boomers led to the rise in housing prices; see Mankiw and Weil (1989) , but this demographic shift seems to have occurred much earlier. also refer to the housing sector. They show how baby-boomer activity forced a ow of investments out of equity and into housing. In addition to that, in their argument, ination plays a critical role through its impact on bond prices. Schneider et al.(2007) , use a portfolio approach and argue that the fraction of housing assets in households`portfolios went down in the 1980s, whereas the fraction of equity held in those portfolios rose rapidly in the 1990s. Then, the trend reversed, starting in 2000-2001, with a rapid increase in housing assets. They attribute this to the shift in expected returns from three type of assets: xed income, equity, and real estate. They argue that this large change in asset allocation was related to the ination rate of the 1980s. Housing assets and equity assets show a negative co-movement which seems to arise from their dierent sensitivity to ination rates. Yet, still the question remains: why equity prices and returns relatively declined as compared to housing prices and returns? Why did the housing asset boom take over the equity boom starting at the end of the 1990s? Is the answer simply a shift from Internet equities into housing? Shiller (2006 Shiller ( , 2007 attributes the housing boom to some overshooting mechanisms and excess volatility, rst in the equity market and then, second, in the real estate sector. More specically, Schiller points out that investors are usually not up-to-date on the latest economic models. For example, there is a money "illusion" in which investors base their decisions on nominal interest rates when real rates would be more appropriate. The phenomena is also visible in equity markets where price-to-dividend ratios can signicantly overshoot their mean values.
To discuss this argument within the context of housing markets, one may have to look at how this overshooting manifests itself in terms of asset pricing. In Finicelli (2007) we see that the housing price-to-rent ratio shows a rapid upward deviation from its mean beginning in 2003. More interestingly, we see that by many other measures, e.g., the housing price-todisposable income ratio and debt service-to-personal income ratio, have been rising as well since the mid-1990s.
Though much work takes the real estate market as the underlying cause for the current boom-bust cycle, other approaches attribute the recent events to technology shocks. Several papers use as basic the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. In the context of real business cycles models, technology and technology shocks drive asset prices.
Yet, usually it is hard to explain boom-bust cycles in an inter-temporal model, since, given a smooth discount factor, temporary blips or deviations of pay-os from the trend get smoothed out. Even strong technology shocks do not deliver such results. Therefore, there have been a few recent studies that attempt to reconstruct boom-bust cycles using RBC models with misperceived technology shocks as driving force. Here, a timelag in the actual implementation of technology, after the perception of a technology shock is seen as the causal factor for the boom-bust cycle; see Beaudry and Portier (2004) , Christiano et al. (2006 Christiano et al. ( , 2007 and in Lansing (2008) . In most of these papers, the expectations dynamics concerns the technology shocks, which, however, is likely to explain only part of the boombust cycle in asset markets.
A very inuential model, along the line of a DSGE model, has been proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999) . This is the nancial accelerator model that proposes that credit cost and credit volume move pro-cyclically, having an amplifying eect on the ups and downs of real activities. Essential, this is collateralized borrowing: with asset prices high, net worth will be high and collateralized borrowing is stimulated. The reverse is supposed to happen in downturns.
5 This approach proposes that credit cost, spread spread, and credit volume depend upon asset prices, can indeed show local amplifying eects on the ups and downs of real activities. Yet, there is some fuzziness regarding the collateral, the borrowing constraints, since they are supposed to be represented by the discounted expected pay-os. The constraints become, in fact, some speculative constraint. Moreover, the evolution of leveraging is usually not tracked and the impact of leveraging, on asset prices, rarely studied. The interaction of asset prices and leveraging is not fully modeled in nancial accelerator approach.
We here take the view which seems to be well settled by theory and stylized facts 6 that boom-bust cycles, e.g., the most recent, may be driven by the linkage of credit and asset prices. Yet more explicitly we want to argue that asset prices are driven by leveraging and expected pay-os. As for borrowing, it is likely that it is not always fully covered by future asset prices and thus, not covered by collateral. Also, the inter-linkages of asset prices and leveraging may trigger for example by some bad news on uncovered leveraging the collapse of the self-justifying mechanism. Overall, we assume that there are non-linearities, possibly giving rise to an asset price boom and then, maybe later on, to a bust.
The recently observed amplication of the expansion and contraction of leveraging 7 is likely to be related to the way new nancial instruments are employed. In the current paper, 7 The observable features that were visible in the latest boom-bust cycle are well known and many papers have been put forward to explain these phenomena.
A detailed discussion can be found in our working paper (same title) located at http://www.newschool.edu/nssr/cem; also see Hall (2011) 8 A similar view on the interaction of leveraging and asset prices, recently magnied by complex securities, risk and remove sensitivity to longer-term prospects. More specically, by grouping large numbers of mortgages together, securitized instruments are created that are very non-robust in performance, i.e., small changes in interest rates, delinquency rates, recovery rates, and default correlations can lead to a collapse of security prices and to the bursting of the bubble.
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We rst discuss the complex securities, which were massively found in the US real estate sector, and which involved signicant leveraging build up, and then we propose a model that captures the crucial interactions of asset prices and leveraging. As starting point for our model we refer to the historical studies on nancial crises by Minsky (1975 Minsky ( , 1982 Minsky ( , 1986 ) and Kindleberger et al. (2005) , but also recent dynamic models such as put forward by Specically, we use Merton's denition of default wherein value follows an exogenouslydetermined Brownian motion and default occurs when the size of the debt exceeds the value of the asset. In Merton's model, asset valuation may be expressed as follows:
where z ∼ N (µ, σ) It can further be shown that the probability of default, given this denition, may be expressed thus:
Note that d is simply the upper limit of the integral shown, the cumulative normal distribution. Following the Chacko et al. (2006) approach, we assume a simple MBS structure with 5 reference assets (mortgages) and 3 tranches, equity, mezzanine, and senior, absorbing the bottom 10%, the second 10%, and the last 80% of the default risk, respectively.
We assume that a default event has occurred when V t < V 0 . In this case, costs to the 
We now compute the Cholesky transformation of P, above, which is dened as
This matrix is computed using a VB program shown in Appendix 1. A convenient property of the Cholesky Transformation is that given a vector, z = (z i ), of n random numbers drawn from a standard Gaussian distribution, then for ρ i,j = k, the vector c=P×z is a vector of n random numbers which are correlated with ρ i,j = k. By substituting c for z in the valuation equation above, we can generate default events with known correlation. Further, by using Monte Carlo simulation, we can determine an appropriate pricing structure for each of the tranches.
We suppose, for this simplied MBS, that the attachment points for each of the tranches are as follows:
So, for example, the Mezzanine tranche, g(L(t)) = Loss/Default can be written,
And the resulting spread, for a given time period,
Using the above, we can determine, when a hypothetical SPV is protable and when it is not. In other words, when the amount demanded by potential holders of the dierent tranches exceeds the anticipated cash ows, the SPV is no longer protable. When SPVs are We can also illustrate the distribution of prot/loss for a typical SPV as shown below.
The distribution of success/failure of SPVs is, of course, directly impacted by correlation through the mechanism described. This is shown below for a 10,000-run simulation with = 0.40. In this step, we do not consider the valuation process, but rather use the default probability directly. Also, since we are not interested in investigating the eect of correlation here, we leave it xed at 0. In this step, a MBS security consisting of 100 iid mortgages as reference assets is divided into tranches of size 3% each. Each investor is supposed to have put up $1000 each 1% position. Thus, the expected loss for each tranche is approximated by:
So, for example, if the P r(def ault) = 0.05, the expected loss for the mezzanine level Figure 5 : SPV Probability; ρ = 0.95 tranche (6% -8%) will be~$640 or~21%. This anticipated loss is the minimum compensating interest rate that an investor will demand for purchasing this position. Thus, it is a cost to the SPV. This distribution is shown in Figure 5 .
We can approximate the loss of a tranche, with attachment points a and b, using a normal approximation:
and Φ is the amount invested in 1% of the MBS. We assume that defaults above the upper attachment point result in a total loss to the tranche-holder. The cost to the MBS is then
When the MBS becomes unprotable, there is a corresponding drop in prices driven by the diculty of obtaining nancing. This, in turn drives mortgage rates up, which increases the default rate: a vicious cycle. Figure 6 illustrates the eect of the MBS nancing mechanism operating underneath the housing market. In this section, we use the short-term cyclicality 12 12 Later, in the dynamic model, we will see that this occurs naturally to set indicator variables. Also, graphical analysis suggests over/under shooting. However, at each step, the implied default rate is recalculated. If the recalculated default rate is such that the SPV nancing mechanism becomes less protable, there is a corresponding decrease in value. Then, a new sequence is initiated and the process repeats. Large negative shocks to the implied default rate, which initiates a negative-feedback into the system, cause rapid declines in prices due to a sudden decrease in market liquidity. This is shown below for the actual house price in Figure 6 and the simulated price in Figure 7 .
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We see that our model is well able to explain the stylized facts that were presented in This graph shows the rapid escalation in demanded compensation due to increasing default rates. This means that the spread of premia over the risk free rate, or other bonds, will rapidly go up, and the ABX index representing the underlying bonds will rapidly decrease. Both 14 We can see that the Federal Funds rate can only inuence, perhaps, players considering B-level tranches.
However, changes in the default rate, and the consequences of this and the decline of the ABX index make this only a minor inuence. Further, reducing this same interest rates also reduces SPV income. Thus, while it may have some salutary eect on the default rate, it seems not likely to make a huge dierence for a crisis regime triggered by the required rates demanded by the lower tranches of an MBS. Furthermore, correlation and contagion eects reinforce each other. For example, in a rising market, recovery values may exceed the size of the loan. In such an environment, investors will actually favor a higher default rate because they can obtain property at a discount. On the other hand, in a declining market, recovery values will decrease as the default rate increases. Thus, when overshooting has occurred and defaults are triggered, the eects may be exaggerated.
In addition, the critical variable, the variable that drives the process, is default probability. This is an information asymmetry issue as buyers and sellers have dierent information with respect to default rates. Such informational asymmetries often emerge in places of nancial stress 15 . So, overall, the above pricing model and its results illustrate the nonrobust character of these new nancial instruments of intermediation: change in interest rates, delinquency rates, recovery rates, suddenly rising default risk and default correlations, and rising information asymmetry may make prices of those new complex securities very volatile, leading to sudden and sharp rises or collapses.
14 In particular, the repo rate (unsecured), short term loans from the money market, and what is termed 15 See USFSI, 2010, for more on this.
A Model of Asset Pricing and Leveraging
Above, in our study of complex securities, the asset price, V t , was given exogenously and modeled assuming Brownian motion; the leveraging involved was not explicitly modeled.
This was sucient to study behavior of the phenomena posed there, namely the sensitivity of the value of complex securities to delinquency rates, default correlation, and recovery rates. These aspects of mortgage-backed securities played an important role in the 2007-9 meltdown. We now want to make the asset prices endogenous and their interaction with leveraging explicit.
A number of papers, published by the authors, relate asset prices and debt dynamics in a rather complex way. As in that literature, we want to relate expected payos and asset prices to borrowing.
When the expectations of payos are stimulated by a borrowing boom, this often works hand-in-glove with an asset-price boom; this occurs because asset-price rises will stimulate borrowing. So, while there will be some asset price rise, due to its interaction with borrowing, some bad events, e.g., a collapse in the value of some complex security, may also lead to a sudden decline in asset prices and, hence, borrowing. Since asset prices are essentially determined by discounted future pay-os, leverage can be, alternately, undercovered or overcovered by asset prices.
Note that there might be locally-arising externalities: higher asset prices allow, through higher collateral valuations, increased leveraging. Higher leveraging means more household and rm expenditures, reduced borrowing constraints, and liquidity constraints for agents:
One agent`s reduction of liquidity constraints means more spending; more spending relieves the borrowing and liquidity constraints of other agents. Although our proposed mechanism will, at some level, accelerate borrowing and increase expectations, later, it is likely to lead to a slowdown and may trigger rapid declines. is given in , where asset pricing with loss aversion is studied.
and credit constraints; this implies less demand for credit and more falling asset prices, etc.
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This can, in turn, destabilize rms, nancial intermediaries, and lead to a macroeconomic meltdown. In contrast to common DSGE models, this model is locally unstable, possibly leading to accelerated downturns.
Geanakoplos (2010) employs a similar positive feedback mechanism. His main construction is also a leverage cycle, but one dened in terms of ows. If, for example, someone wants to borrow an initial amount of $100 (maybe a home owner, a hedge fund, or an investment rm) but can pay $20 in cash, then we say that the margin is 20 percent. The leverage ratio is 5. So, the lower their own cash, or equity, contribution, the higher is the leveraging. In the housing sector a leverage ratio of 20 was common before the meltdown 2007-2009 and for investment rms a leverage ratio of 40 to 60 was not unusual.
18 The leverage ratio is the reciprocal of the margin, in this case: 100/20 = 5. The same happens in the money market, when the investment rm is borrowing at a lower margin, the leveraging rises and vice versa.
Geanakoplos argues that during a boom, the margin is lowered and leverage rises. As the margin falls, borrowing increases along with prot expectations. In a recession, the margin is rapidly rising and the reverse happens. This would predict that in booms, leveraging and Yet, as Geanakoplos convincingly argues this stems from a measurement problem, namely that fact that the value of the equity rises in the boom and falls in the recession.
Geanakoplos' theory has immediate implications for asset pricing. Lower margins and higher leveraging takes place in a climate of optimistic expectations and both will drive up asset prices. In recessions there is a pessimistic climate, lower prot expectations as well as lower leveraging and asset prices are falling. Geanakoplos sums up his theory by stating :
... variation in leveraging has a huge impact on the price of assets, contributing to economic bubbles and busts... ...leveraging becomes too high in boom times and too low in bad times. As a result, in boom times asset prices are too high, and in crisis times they are too low. This is the leverage cycle; see Geanakoplos The paper by Miller and Stiglitz (2010) is another work in this direction. As in Geanakoplos, they illustrate the inter-linkages of borrowing in a two period model, in discrete time fashion. By assuming credit restrictions in borrowing, where by the borrowing is constrained by net worth, next period`s discounted value of asset income, which forms the asset value, will constrain current period borrowing. They sketch the relation of borrowing and asset prices in the two period model as:
with b t representing borrowing, and E t q t+1 k t /R , the the value of capital asset next time period. R is a gross return which acts as the discount rate used to obtain the present value of the expected capital value of next time period. Given fully collateralized borrowing, where borrowing is constrained by the given (expected) collateral value, empirically this would predict a high correlation of borrowing and the discounted expected pay-os of capital investments. This is a relation that is also used in our model below. Thus, for both the lender as well as the borrower, the collateral value is often quite fuzzy, and subject to speculation.
So, we want to note that borrowing is not always fully covered by collateral value. Leveraging may sometimes be over-covered by the value of collateral and sometimes under-covered. Employing the basic elements in the construction of the leveraging -asset price interaction, as proposed in the above mentioned work, we want to sketch a model that works with ows and stocks, exhibits one dynamic decision variable (investment), but also exhibits, as in Hall (2010, Ch. 7) two state equations: The dynamics of capital assets and the dynamics of debt.
Here, then, borrowing and the evolution of debt is driving asset prices and rising asset prices may feed back into borrowing. Yet, realism suggests that one should avoid a completely unstable mechanism through positive feedback eects; therefore, we will keep the dynamics bounded through some reasonable constraints. We will also allow the leverage either not to be fully covered by collateral value or to be over-covered.
As is the case in most of the above literature, we concentrate on rms (real rms, nancial rms) that are allowed to borrow and to leverage their activities. In a traditional model of asset pricing the limit of the leveraging is the value of the rm. Usually, since Merton (1974) , it is assumed that the asset value of the rm is given by a Brownian motion when the rm's debt is priced, as also assumed in the prior section. Then the adding-up theorem, namely V = S + b is supposed to hold where V is the asset value, S the value of stocks and b the value of bonds. The distance of the value of the rm to the debt is called the distance to default, commonly employed in the KMV model. Yet, we not only want to determine the value of assets endogenously, but also show how it might be impacted by leveraging.
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Let us rst focus on the typical rm's inter-temporal investment strategy to accumulate capital assets. For the debt equation we assume, that debt can be continuously issued and retired. We can interpret the rm as real company producing output, or as a nancial intermediary producing nancial services and buying assets through borrowing. In both cases, the rm borrows to invest in capital assets and the expected cash ows determine its asset value. As in the traditional model, the value of the rm represents its debt capacity, but in our model there are also feedback eects from leveraging to the value of the rm. If the debt is equal to the value of the rm, there is likely to be a default even if only small shocks occur. Yet, if the debt taken on by the rm is lower than the value of the rm there is a positive distance to default and shocks to the value of the rm may not lead to defaults.
Such distance-to-default models have found wide-spread acceptance in the industry, e.g. the KMV model, which has become popular among nancial market practitioners.
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Since we want to use stocks and ows, we employ a model that is similar to Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010) and Mittnik and Semmler (2010) where there are two state equations.
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Employing the above sketched theory by Geanakoplos (2010), we can study the following dynamic-decision problem of a rm 23
.ḃ
The (expected) cash ow to be managed by the rm is composed of net income and expected prot ows. As we will show below the latter will be a function of the distribution of the borrowing to capital ratio. We thus dene: 
The ow f (k, j), 24 is discounted to obtain the asset value of the rm. It is generated from production function, Ak α , minus investment, j, and minus the adjustment cost of capital ϕ(k, j) = j β k −γ plus the expected prot ow, θ(b/k)b, related to borrowing, 25 Investment is the choice variable in order to maximize the present value of the total cash ow of (4). Note that σ > 0, 0 < α < 1, β > 1, γ > 0, are constants.
Equ. (2) represents the equation for accumulation of capital assets. The equ. (3) represents the second state variable, the evolution of the debt of the rm, with the primary
Equ. (4) shows that the primary decit of a rm, g(k, j), is equal to total income, generated by the production function, minus investment (including adjustments costs); if there is negative primary decit, debt can be retired.
Furthermore, as both Brunnermeier, Sannikov, and Geanakoplos argue, if asset values are high, the margin requirements will be low and the borrowing high. So, if the rm will raise additional funds from the credit market in the amount φ(b/k)b, which will increase its debt, it will also increase the prot expectations, and the present value which is to be obtained through an optimal investment strategy j.
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Thus the borrowed funds, which relaxes the constraints for investment, will indirectly also impact the investment strategies and the asset price. So, the raised funds are, as in Geanakoplos (2010), ows in equ (4) which will drive up investment into capital assets and asset prices. On the other hand, as we will show, the increase of asset prices will lead to a higher leverage so that φ(b/k)b will go up too. As we will demonstrate this will not go on indenitely, there will be constraints for this dynamics which we will discuss below. Of course, the borrowing term φ(b/k)b, which raises the expectations of higher cash ows, from which investment into assets can be undertaken, also increases debt.
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As mentioned above one can think of the term θ(b/k)b in (4) as capturing some expectation dynamics.
28 Geanakoplos (2010) has given a justication of this term as an expectation 24 We leave out the time index.
25 Note we are using here the argument by Geanakoplos (2010) that there is ... the expectation by the leveraged ... that good times are coming, so leveraging is accompanied by optimism in prot expectations, see our justication below.
26 Note that Geanakoplos (2010) would have in the leverage function (4) and (5) the time rate of change of debt over assets, namelyθ(ḃ/k) and φ(ḃ/k). Yet since we need to work with the evolution of stocks, we use the ratio of debt-to-stock, θ(b/k) as argument. This is reasonable, since eventually the ows will eect this ratio. We also tried the formulation of using ows, employing our dynamic programming algorithm, the results for the value function, and the dynamics of capital assets and debt came out are roughly the same in the ow version of Geanakoplos as compared to our proposed version using stocks in the equs (4) and (5 30 This can continue for a considerable time period and a credit expansion might even go on without collateral-secured loans, or without margin payment at all. Thus, we might want to perceive θ(b/k) as representing a movement that is for a considerable time period above its mean, or below its mean. It cannot be ignored or included as simply noise. We will also assume that expected future asset prices might under-cover or over-cover leveraging.
Our postulated positive correlation of prot expectations and leveraging resembles the Miller and Stiglitz (2010) idea. We can maintain the following: as anticipated prot potential increases, so does the degree of leveraging that a rm is willing to take on and the nancial intermediaries are willing to grant. The main measure of leverage is the debt to capital ratio. This is also a measure of the riskiness of a loan. Thus, the higher the debt to capital ratio, the higher the borrowing costs, as appearing in equ (3), yet associated with it is also a higher anticipate prots. For the borrowing cost, there may be limits. On the down side, there is a certain rate, the risk free rate, below which no rm can borrow. Similarly, there is an upper limit to the rate that may be charged. This denes the shape of our borrowing cost, r(b/k)b,
Now, clearly, no rm knows for sure what the prot level associated with a particular degree of leverage. However, there are expectations associated with the degree of leveraging.
In other words, a bank would probably assume that the high degree of leveraging associated with a debt-to-capital ratio implies high prot expectations on the part of the rm's managers, but the prot expectations might not be linear. This the higher leveraging implies a high degree of risk to the bank. Thus, the prot expectations of the rm are proxied by the debt-to-capital ratio, but with a declining increase as the leveraging goes up. Though in absolute terms in may hold that the larger the debt taken on, the higher the prots expected.
Now we have to make explicit our functions employed. We suppose that a credit manager would reason that the relevant factors in his analysis would be (1) the probability that the rm's debt-to-capital ratio remains below some threshold, (2) the actual size of the debt taken on, and (3) some industry or rm-specic factor(s). The expected value of additional prots due to borrowing might thus be stylized as follows:
they could start to synchronize on one side or the other, so that overall the prot expectations would be driven up or down.
29 A prot-expectations term, such as the one we use in equ (4), is also used in Adams and Marcet (2010) . Note that our term is discounted to obtain the asset value. In Adams and Marcet, the mean prot expectations term is stylized as a result of a learning process involving economic agents, i.e., as the persistent component of their expectations. However, the agents do not consider leveraging.
30 This idea goes back to Kalecki (1937a Kalecki ( , 1937b , though there in a zero horizon model.
where θ bt kt is the probability of the debt-to-capital ratio remaining below bt kt . Obviously, as this ratio increases, the riskiness, and hence the risk premium, will also climb. But this, in fact, occurs with a delay, so we will stylize its instantaneous impact as small. • 
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Thus, in spite of high leveraging during this period, we might observe an optimistic view of prot expectations, low risk premia and low credit spreads, and few credit constraints. So, in our model the instantaneous impact of the debt-to-capital ratio on the premium will be low (see below).
Finally, we should not assume that the actual debt-to-capital ratios would be normally distributed around some target value, as has been common in many nancial studies. In light of recent nancial history, it would seem that a leptokurtic (fat-tailed) distribution would be more appropriate. In our model, therefore, we suppose that the debt-to-capital ratio follows a hyperbolic-secant distribution:
This distribution is almost identical to the Standard Gaussian Normal distribution, µ = 0, σ = 1, but with a kurtosis of 5 instead of 3. This seems a more appropriate choice than 
Thus, we stylize our cdf as
The function (6) For the prot expectation dynamics we thus take
Taking (9) and (10) 
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The economic interpretation is that nancial agents are likely to become more cautious in their expectations of prot ows or in the actual amount to be borrowed as the ratio of b/k rises. In terms of the expected prots, for example, that means that an already high expected cash ow might deter agents to expect this to prevail at such a level for too long.
As to our above mentioned state-dependent risk premium and credit cost, r(b/k), we have taken a similar function, which is calibrated in a way that reects a risk free interest rate in the limit (that of no debt). Thus, here we consider a case where the rm has to pay a default or nance premium, but the impact on the debt dynamics is initially kept low, as justied 35 Other (nonlinear) relationships could be introduced between the leveraging and expected cash ow, but in order to demonstrate the mechanics of this basic model, our above formulation is sucient. Note that in the numerical solution procedure, we do not extend the arctan function to the negative region. This is avoided by using our DP algorithm in the positive state space.
above. 36 We restrict our considerations here to the simplest case, as in equ (3), where the rm pays a risk premium formulated in a simple way.
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If the interest rate, r, is a constant 38 , and the debt dynamic term, φ(b/k)b, and prot expectations dynamic term, θ(b/k), drop out then we have a simple case: it is then easy to see the debt capacity is V (k), the present value of k. 39 For any value of debt, b, below V , holds that V − b > 0 and the residual remains as equity of the rm.
40 Yet, for studying the inter-linkages between leveraging and asset prices a constant interest rate is an unrealistic formulation.
Next we solve the model of equs. (1)- (10) using our dynamic programming algorithm as sketched in Appendix 2. The solution gives us the asset value as the maximum debt capacity that the agents can take on; note that the asset value is aected by leveraging through prot expectations. Also, we solve the above model with the terms φ(b/k) and θ(b/k) in equs. (3) and (4). Overall we have a dynamic decision problem with one decision variable and two state variables; thus, the model is highly non-linear. This can be turned into a dynamic programming problem. Gruene and Semmler (2004) have developed an algorithm to solve such dynamic programming problems with a numerical algorithm. Our DP method, sketched in Appendix 2, goes back to papers by Capuzzo-Dolcetta (1983), Falcone (1987) , and Gruene (1997).
We rst want to study a benchmark case where there may be past debt but no new leveraging, so the terms φ(b/k)b, and θ (b/k) b are zero. As the results of our solutions show, the value of the rm is low, see Figure 9 , and moves in waves, due to the risk premium's moving with the debt to capital stock ratio.
The results of our exercises of solving the asset pricing model with no new borrowing and prot expectations terms provides us with the following graph.
36 We will stylize our slow inuence of the debt to capital ratio on the risk premium by using a small coecient and thus a long adjustment time; introducing an actual delay here would give rise to a delay model, which is complicated to solve -see Maurer and Semmler (2010).
As mentioned above, we use the same arctan function-type for the risk premium. This has a lower limit, the risk free rate, and an upper limit. The upper limit of a premium charged is justied, since, as Stiglitz has always argued, with higher default premia, the lender might have loan losses at greater credit spreads.
38 As aforementioned, in computing the present value of the future net income, we do not have to assume a particular xed interest rate. In an even more general setting than is used in our formulation above, the present value, V (k, b), can also, for the optimal investment decision, enter as an argument in a more general credit cost function H (k, V (k)); see Gruene, Semmler and Sieveking (2005) . 39 This is the standard case in which it holds that sustainable leverage is lim t→∞ e −rt b(t) = 0, as the nonexplosiveness condition for debt, to close the model. But note that our model is more complex.
40 The more general case, however, occurs when there is an endogenous default premium. If we have a more general form of φ (b, k), then the creditworthiness itself might become dicult to treat. Pontryagin's maximum principle is not suitable to solve the problem with endogenous default premium and endogenous net worth and we thus need to use special numerical methods to solve for the present value and investment strategy of a levered rm (see Gruene, Chen, and Semmler (2008) . Note, however, looking at Figure 9 , if the debt is rising (see the horizontal axis), then debt eventually becomes higher than the value of the rm and bankruptcy will occur, since the distance to default has become zero.
41 For any smaller amount of debt there would be a positive distance to default and the rm could pay its liabilities, keeping the remaining part as equity, as the Merton model suggests.
We also present the vector eld of the benchmark model; this is shown in Figure 10 . As the gure shows, there are regions of the state space that are stable, capital stock shrinks, and debt goes to zero and there appears to be an attracting point at capital stock roughly k * = 0.5, except debt is already too high.
As one can observe from gure 10 there is a large region of stability where capital stock and debt contract. There is also a size of initial debt where debt will not shrink, but rise, due to payment of the risk premium. With high debt, the debt is driven up further because of the high risk premium.
Next we want to introduce the impact of new leveraging and prot expectations on asset Since now there is a leverage eect on prot expectations, though to a limited extent, the value function is higher than in the case of Figure 9 . Also, when debt is built up (see the debt is going up roughly to 1.2) the asset value is represented by the value function and thus the asset value is higher as compared to the case of no new borrowing. Thus the asset value is going up with borrowing. But, of course, also the debt is rising faster, since fresh borrowing occurs and with fresh borrowing there is a rise in asset value. Since the dynamics is roughly the same as in the case of Figure 9 we will forgo the presentation of the gure.
Yet, whereas in Figure 9 the debt below 1 already is a problem (since the asset value is much too low), in the case of Figure 11 there is a bankruptcy risk when the debt reaches roughly 1.
In the next case we want to allow high leveraging and high prot expectations.
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In the case of Figure 12 , as one would expect, the value function and thus the value of the rm becomes larger and the build up of debt becomes less of problem since the distance to default is still positive, at least for a debt going up roughly to 1.4. Here too the dynamics in debt and capital assets is roughly the same as in Figure 3 except that the separation line of attracting and repelling dynamics moves further inward. Above we see also another eect mentioned above. The asset value of the rm rises faster if there is borrowing, at least up to a point, then the debt dynamics takes over, the asset value falls fast, and the distance to default quickly shrinks leading to the bankruptcy case with asset value smaller than the liabilities.
In the next case we evaluate what happens if the agents become over-optimistic in terms of prot expectations, as compared to the actual leverage undertaken.
44 In this case borrowing could be lower than the actual value of collateral.
In Figure 13 we can see slow debt build up with a coecient of debt-value build up of 0.05 in the leveraging. This leads to slow asset build up through the prot expectation function, but it also can lead to insolvency. The value function in principle can go up to 46 The intuition here is that with the rise of bonus payment the debt will rise faster.
As we can observe there is not so much dierence with Figure 13 , there are two eects working: if debt rises relative to asset value, due to bonuses, that increase debt burden and credit spread, but if the prot expectations rises too, asset value will rise, see Figure 14 . The the increase of debt due to bonus payments comes from the fact that the bonus payments will reduce net come available for debt repayment.
If we rotate the value curve we can see another eect.
As Figure 15 shows if one slices the value function along the dynamics of debt, the value function obtains a changing form.
Though the previous gures have shown the ups and downs in the value of the rm as a function of both the size of capital assets and leveraging, Figure 15 shows the further rotated value function clearly exhibiting a movement of the asset value as a function of the capital assets, k : rst rising with the level of capital assets and then falling.
47 But there is also Next, we want to explore if there are multiple regions of attraction. This can best be seen by plotting the optimal vector elds for dierent initial conditions. This is done in Figure   16 . Figure 16 plots the vector eld for the dynamics of the two state variables in the entire state space. This shows there are dierent regions of attraction. As is clearly visible in gure 16, for low levels of capital, the capital shrinks further and debt rises. We have already seen that if the value of assets is lower than leveraging, insolvency will arise. This is made visible here: as trajectories contracting with respect to capital assets, they can be rising in terms of debt. On the other hand, low borrowing can maintain positive capital assets. Large capital assets and borrowing will make both rise and high-level attractors for both variables appear.
Finally we show results of the case when we start with the previous case but introduce a higher bonus payment.
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Clearly, as we can predict from equ. (3), debt builds up; the debt rises even faster because there is less net income and debt retirement and also through the rise of the risk premium and credit spread. Yet, on the other hand, due to overoptimism and rising prot expectations, the asset value is rising too, as we can observe from Figure 17 . Thus asset value rises quickly with higher leveraging, but this case can also quickly turn into insolvency or bankruptcy, since the capital assets falls quickly after the peak and the distance to default dissipates quickly. Next we want to show the vector eld of this.
As to the vector eld, if one compares the Figure 18 with Figure 10 , where there is no new borrowing and no eect on prot expectations, in Figure 18 there is only a small region of stability. Trajectories to the right of the bifurcation line move quickly up to high debt, and we quickly will have the situation of V < b, the bankruptcy scenario.
We can summarize our results in several points:
• Higher debt to capital asset ratio usually entails risk premia and credit spreads, this can produce uctuations in asset value and higher bankruptcy risk (two regions of attraction arise, one sustainable, and another one unsustainable)
• Taking into account the linkage of leveraging and prot expectations, the asset value of capital is likely to rise thought there can sometimes be excessive optimism with respect to leveraging or low prot expectations with regard to the leveraged investments (thus borrowing is sometimes over-covered by expected collateral value and sometimes under-covered)
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• If there are two regions of attractions arising, which are likely to occur with further nonlinearities -nonlinearities over and above the one creating the risk premium then again one region represents usually sustainable debt, the other region: bankruptcies bankruptcies occurring whenever V<b 49 Since there is the future-thinking involved in calculating asset prices, the collateral values as constraints are mostly speculative. One could thus speak of a speculative constraints for borrowing.
• If the three dimensional value function representation is reduced to a two dim representation by slicing the value function along the debt dimension, one can observe the changing value functions for dierent levels of debt
• With bonus payments (and other factors), causing the rise of the debt to capital ratio, the debt is rising faster but if the euphoric boom and over-optimism in prot expectations is accompanying the rise of debt, the asset value also rises quickly but also falls quickly, entailing nancial fragility, disruptions and busts.
As we have discussed in Section 2, the risk transfer by nancial rms using complex securities have amplied the risk taking but decreased the risk screening of borrowers. These magnifying forces are particularly relevant in explaining the most recent boom-bust cycle. It also gave rise to the housing boom experienced by individuals who are not, in general, equity
players. Yet, instead of looking there for explanation, we believe that it was the growth of the CDO industry, specically MBS products, that suddenly released excessive risk taking and a vast amount of capital to risky investments.
Taking into account the dynamics that complex securities might add to the complexity of intermediation, and to higher leveraging and asset pricing, one should mention further important factors, contributing to the high asset value of complex securities. For example, were the expectations based on low delinquency rates, low default correlations, or high pay os? Higher leveraging than was justied by asset values, apparently, created slight changes in delinquency rates in the housing sector, triggering insolvencies and default correlations making leveraging shrink. Lower leveraging caused asset prices to fall and the vicious cycle downward continued.
The existence of multiple attractors might explain the characteristic overshooting phenomena seen in the Case-Schiller index with the sudden decline. Investors above/below this point continue to make investment decisions that increase/decrease the size of their assets.
At rst, this is realized as increased market value. However, as they continue to increase assets, they may overshoot to investment levels that are unsustainable. If the investors are able to sustain investment of sucient size to get beyond some critical level, but with further leveraging, as we showed, asset value will eventually fall. Yet there was the sudden drop of asset prices, as well as leveraging this might have come, as argued above, from the sensitivity of the pricing of complex securities with respect to small changes in delinquency rates, default correlations and so on, and this might also explain the collapse of the Case-Shiller index.
Many had expected real estate prices to level o around 2001 -the end of the dot-com era. Instead, we see real estate prices breaking through the barriers to new levels from 2000 to 2007. Also, as we can see from the single-family home sales, volume follows a similar pattern. We believe that it was the growth of the complex securities, specically MBS and CDO products, and their expected rising prices that suddenly released vast amounts of capital to risky investments and magnied the usual boom-bust cycle.
4
Conclusions
It appears that many boom-bust cycles are driven by linkages between leveraging and and asset prices, yet leveraging could be over-covered or under-covered by collateral value. As we show, collateral value appears a rather fuzzy concept based on speculative elements. The mechanism observable in boom-bust cycles is rather general: the boom period triggers overcondence, overvaluation of assets, over-leveraging, underestimation of risk, and over-issuing of unsecured loans; then follows a triggering event and the market mood turns pessimistic;
nally, undervaluation of asset prices and deleveraging takes place. In contrast to their work we refer also to the asset pricing mechanism that seems to have magnied the boom bust cycle and accelerated the crash. As we have shown, these new types of complex assets can lead to a rapid rise and then decline in asset valuations. This seems to originate in an intrinsic non-robustness in prot expectations and asset pricing of the new nancial instruments in connection with leveraged nancing. We have shown, using a pricing model for the complex securities, the non-robust character of these new nancial instruments of intermediation: change of interest rates, delinquency rates, recovery rates, sudden rise of default risk and default correlations may make prices of those new complex securities very volatile, magnifying sharp rises or collapses of asset pricing, credit, and economic activity.
Some of those phenomena were attempted to be captured in a simple dynamic model of asset pricing and leveraging. 
Solution Method
We here briey describe the dynamic programming algorithm as applied in Gruene and Semmler (2004) that enables us to numerically solve our dynamic model variants. The feature of the dynamic programming algorithm is an adaptive discretization of the state space which leads to high numerical accuracy with moderate use of memory.
Such algorithm is applied to discounted innite horizon optimal control problems of the type introduced for the study of the global dynamics. In our model variants we have to numerically compute V (x) for V (x) = max uˆ∞ 0 e −θt f (x, u)dt
where u represents a vector of control variables and x a vector of state variables; this represents, in our case, the stock of wealth and debt.
In the rst step, the continuous time optimal control problem has to be replaced by a rst 
and h > 0 is the discretization time step. Note that j = (j i ) i∈N 0 here denotes a discrete control sequence.
The optimal value function is the unique solution of a discrete Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman 
for each node x i of the grid, where the value of V Γ h for points x which are not grid points (these are needed for the evaluation of T h ) is determined by linear interpolation. We refer to the paper cited above for the description of iterative methods for the solution of (A5).
Note that an approximately optimal control law (in feedback form for the discrete dynamics) can be obtained from this approximation by taking the value j * (x) = j for j realizing the maximum in (A3), where V h is replaced by V Γ h . This procedure in particular allows the numerical computation of approximately optimal trajectories.
In order the distribute the nodes of the grid eciently, we make use of a posteriori error estimation. For each cell C l of the grid Γ we compute
More precisely we approximate this value by evaluating the right hand side in a number of test points. It can be shown that the error estimators η l give upper and lower bounds for the real error (i.e., the dierence between V j and V Γ h ) and hence serve as an indicator for a possible local renement of the grid Γ. It should be noted that this adaptive renement of the grid is very eective for computing steep value functions and models with non-dierential value functions and multiple equilibria, see Gruene and Semmler (2004) .
5.3
Alternative Formulations: Default Premia and Wealth Accu- 
In general, the movement of such bubble term, capturing synchronized behavior of agents, can be modeled by a set of sine-cosine functions, representing oscillations with dierent frequency and amplitude depending on time. Such a model can exhibit sharp peaks and troughs. Note that movements of r(t) do not necessarily need to be smooth. Using DFT, as in our above formulation of the problem there can be sharp peaks and collapses, as in the saw tooth function, in the DFT composed of a set of sine-cosine functions of dierent frequency and amplitude. This will occur less so in our formulation above. This could replace our 2 dimensional formulation r(b/k) if it is too cumbersome. We can use the above harmonic regression which gives very similar results.
Wealth Accumulation with Preferences
Since, in the model of section 3, the state variable k could represent wealth, our simple version, with constant interest rate, r, can be turned into a commonly used dynamic portfolio Hereby r f is the risk free interest rate, for details see Hsiao and Semmler (2009) . Wealth is increasing through a return r W and reduced by xed retirement of wealth, δ W . We can think of ak α = y, with y total income; then, the marginal product of capital is r k = αk (1−α) = r W , which has been used as the return above (it could have originated in real capital, housing stock, or other activities). Yet the above set-up, by excluding the eects arising from the leveraging and prot expectation terms, as included in the model of section 3, would not generate the booms bust scenarios as are studied in section 3.
